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Plea Bargaining and  
Collateral Consequences:  
An Experimental Analysis  
 
The overwhelming majority of convictions in the United States 
are obtained through guilty pleas. Many of these guilty pleas are a 
product of plea bargaining, where a defendant enters a guilty plea in 
exchange for some form of official concessions. Despite its prominence, 
plea bargaining is subject to limited regulation. One consequence of this 
limited regulation is that courts generally only require the direct 
consequences of a guilty plea to be communicated to a defendant. Thus, 
when a defendant is deciding whether to plead guilty, he is often 
operating with incomplete information about the costly collateral 
consequences that may attach to a criminal conviction. The dominant 
theory of plea bargaining suggests that outcomes will largely mirror trial 
outcomes because bargaining occurs in the shadow of trial, but this may 
not be accurate if failure to communicate collateral consequences 
influences decisions to plead guilty. 
Using an experiment, this Note examines the extent to which 
communicating collateral consequences influences the decision to accept 
a plea bargain. Results from the experiment demonstrate that 
communicating collateral consequences decreases the rate of plea 
acceptance, but the effect of communication dissipates as the difference 
between the plea bargain sentence and the potential sentence at trial 
grows larger. Because communicating collateral consequences has an 
important effect on guilty pleas, this Note suggests that a lawyer’s failure 
to communicate such consequences to their client should be grounds for 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the 
world. Its incarceration rate is nearly seven percent higher than the 
next closest country (El Salvador) and more than four times greater 
than rates in Western Europe.1 At the end of 2016, an estimated 6.6 
million people were under U.S. correctional system supervision.2 The 
overwhelming majority of them came under correctional supervision 
not after a trial, but after pleading guilty. Ninety-four to ninety-seven 
percent of all convictions are obtained through guilty pleas.3  
Despite their prominence, cases resolved by guilty pleas have 
long been subject to limited regulation. While the Supreme Court has 
increasingly regulated jury trials with exacting requirements, such as 
requiring prosecutors to produce live witnesses and prove aggravating 
 
 1. John Gramlich, America’s Incarceration Rate is at a Two-Decade Low, PEW RES. CTR. 
(May 2, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/02/americas-incarceration-rate-is-
at-a-two-decade-low/ [https://perma.cc/YD25-DJYM]. 
 2. Danielle Kaeble & Mary Cowhig, Correctional Populations in the United States, 2016, 
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 1 (Apr. 2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus16.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GES9-E28J]. 
 3. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S. 356, 372 
(2010) (noting that “[p]leas account for nearly 95% of all criminal convictions”).  
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facts beyond a reasonable doubt, plea bargaining has remained 
remarkably laissez faire.4 The Court’s hands-off approach to plea 
bargaining is rooted in both practicality and theory. The judicial system 
relies on guilty pleas to resolve the overwhelming majority of criminal 
cases, so dampening the use of plea bargaining would be costly.5 
Further, because defendants are presumed to plead based on expected 
trial outcomes—the shadow of a trial theory—the Court has historically 
assumed that innocent defendants will not plead guilty and outcomes 
of any bargaining will be similar to trial outcomes because defendants’ 
rights are protected through jury trial procedures.6  
Symptomatic of the free market approach to plea bargaining, 
courts generally only require that the direct consequences of a guilty 
plea be communicated to a defendant.7 When deciding whether to plead 
guilty, individuals often operate with incomplete information about the 
severity of the offer’s consequences. Defense attorneys are generally not 
required to communicate collateral consequences, or costly nonpenal 
sanctions that attach to a criminal conviction.8 Among these are 
eviction from public housing, loss of voting rights, loss of professional 
and occupational licenses, and denial of food stamps.9  
 
 4. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to 
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2011) (“[T]he Supreme Court has promulgated 
exacting procedures to regulate jury trials . . . [b]ut even as trial procedures hypertrophied, plea 
bargaining remained all but unregulated . . . .”). 
 5. See Warren Burger, The State of the Judiciary—1970, 56 A.B.A. J. 929, 931 (1970) (“A 
reduction from 90 per cent to 80 per cent in guilty pleas requires the assignment of twice the 
judicial manpower and facilities—judges, court reporters, bailiffs, clerks, jurors and courtrooms. 
A reduction to 70 per cent trebles this demand.”).  
 6. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (“Defendants advised by 
competent counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of 
intelligent choice in response to prosecutorial persuasion [in the context of plea bargains], and 
unlikely to be driven to false self-condemnation.”); Bibas, supra note 4, at 1124 (“Plea bargaining 
supposedly takes place in the shadow of expected trial outcomes, so regulation of trials should 
theoretically protect plea-bargaining defendants as well.”). 
 7. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970) (holding plea bargaining 
constitutional and requiring guilty pleas to be made with an understanding of all the direct 
consequences of entering a guilty plea); see also Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 
1366 (4th Cir. 1973) (distinguishing between direct and collateral consequences by examining 
whether the consequence was a “definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of 
the defendant’s punishment”); Hutchison v. United States, 450 F.2d 930, 931 (10th Cir. 1971) (per 
curiam) (holding that the defense attorney’s failure to advise on an administrative punishment, in 
addition to the criminal punishment, did not constitute ineffective assistance because it was not a 
“definite practical consequence of the plea”). 
 8. See Collateral Consequences Inventory, COUNCIL OF STATE GOVT’S JUST. CTR., 
https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/database/results/?jurisdiction=&consequence_category=&narro
w_category=&triggtrigg_offense_category=&consequence_type=&duration_category=&page_num
ber=1 (last visited Mar. 16, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ZJ4Z-VZA6] (cataloguing potential collateral 
consequences for convictions across jurisdictions, including loss of business licenses, removal from 
political office, and ineligibility for various jobs). 
 9. Id.  
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If the theoretical underpinnings of the Supreme Court’s 
approach to plea bargaining are sound—innocent defendants will not 
plead guilty and outcomes will largely mirror trial outcomes—then the 
lack of communication about collateral consequences is harmless. If, 
however, the theoretical underpinnings are not sound, then the failure 
to communicate important collateral consequences may influence 
defendants’ decisions to accept or reject plea bargain offers, including 
innocent defendants. Ultimately, this is an empirical question—one 
which has not been satisfactorily answered. Despite the existence of 
considerable scholarship related to factors influencing plea bargain 
acceptance and the merits and effects of collateral consequences, there 
has been little investigation of how the two interact. 
Using an experiment, this Note examines the extent to which 
communicating collateral consequences influences the decision to 
accept a plea bargain that requires the defendant to plead guilty and 
waive the right to trial. Specifically, it tests the effect of communicating 
such consequences on decisions to plead guilty when the prosecutor has 
offered a guaranteed sentence, as opposed to when the prosecutor offers 
a recommended sentence or a defendant enters a guilty plea without 
any bargaining agreement. Though the experiment directly tests the 
effect of communicating collateral consequences on only a portion of 
guilty pleas, the findings likely have implications for other types of 
guilty pleas.  
Part I provides background on plea bargaining, collateral 
consequences, and the Supreme Court’s approach to plea bargaining. 
Part II discusses and critiques the dominant theoretical justification for 
plea bargaining: the shadow of a trial theory. Part III describes the 
experiment used in this Note and presents the results demonstrating 
the importance of communicating collateral consequences. Part IV 
argues that, in light of the experimental results, defense counsel must 
communicate collateral consequences to their clients.  
I. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS 
A. Plea Bargaining 
Plea bargaining, broadly defined, involves a defendant’s entry of 
a guilty plea in exchange for some form of “official concessions.”10 
Typically, these concessions take the form of a reduced sentence 
imposed by the court, a reduced sentence recommended by the 
 
 10. Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1979) (“Plea 
bargaining consists of the exchange of official concessions for a defendant’s act of self-conviction.”). 
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prosecutor, or a reduction in the nature of the offense charged by the 
prosecutor.11 Legal historians generally agree that the practice of plea 
bargaining in the United States emerged during the early or mid-
nineteenth century, became a standard feature of urban criminal courts 
near the end of the nineteenth century, and grew substantially during 
the twentieth century.12 Scholars offer numerous explanations for the 
growth trajectory of plea bargaining practice in the country, including 
(1) crowded court dockets;13 (2) pretrial detention;14 (3) lawyer 
characteristics and incentives;15 (4) increasingly careful selection of 
cases by police and prosecutors;16 (5) greater access to defense counsel;17 
(6) increasingly cumbersome and time consuming jury trial 
procedures;18 and (7) sentencing practices that made penalties at trial 
more certain.19 
Today, “plea bargaining is a defining, if not the defining, feature 
of the present federal criminal justice system.”20 In 2017, consistent 
with the last fifteen years, over ninety-seven percent of federal criminal 
 
 11. See id. at 3 & n.11 (explaining that other possible concessions include leniency to a 
defendant’s accomplices, withholding damaging information from court, the date of trial, and 
correctional institution placement, among others).  
 12. See id. at 19, 25–29, 34 (explaining that plea bargaining began appearing in appellate 
court reports after the Civil War and grew in the twentieth century, particularly around 
prohibition in the 1920s and in light of increasing caseloads in the 1960s); George Fisher, Plea 
Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 859 (2000) (arguing that plea bargaining was common 
by the 1920s); Lawrence M. Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 247, 248 (1979) (articulating that plea bargaining was present in the late 1800s, became 
common in the 1920s and 1930s, and became prevalent in the 1950s).  
 13. E.g., Arnold Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW 
ENF’T AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 108, 112 (1967).  
 14. See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal 
Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 124 (2005) (“Because defendants who remain in detention before 
trial are more anxious to resolve their cases, they plead guilty more often than defendants who are 
released pending trial . . . .”). 
 15. See, e.g., Malcolm M. Feeley, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 199, 
200 (1979) (referencing “the low quality of public defenders, the financial incentives of private 
attorneys, [and] the laziness of prosecutors” as potential causes of increased plea bargaining).  
 16. See, e.g., Lynn M. Mather, Comments on the History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 281, 284 (1979) (“[W]hen cases undergo extensive pretrial screening before they reach court, 
there are relatively few genuine disputes over guilt or innocence left to be resolved by juries.”).  
 17. See, e.g., Feeley, supra note 15, at 201 (“Ironically, the expanded use of defense counsel 
may have sounded the death knell for the trial in all but a few cases.”) 
 18. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 10, at 41 (“For all the praise lavished upon the American 
jury trial, this fact-finding mechanism has become so cumbersome and expensive that our society 
refuses to provide it.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 14, at 129 (“Changes in federal sentencing practices during 
the 1980s and 1990s increased the certainty and size of the penalty for going to trial, and mightily 
influenced the guilty plea and acquittal rates during those times.”) 
 20. Mary Patrice Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice: Prosecutorial Perspectives 
on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2006).  
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cases were resolved through guilty pleas.21 The state level also has an 
overwhelming number of convictions obtained via guilty plea, with 
more than ninety-five percent of felony convictions resulting from such 
pleas.22 These convictions consist of a combination of “straight up” 
pleas23 and plea bargains,24 although the portions of each are unclear.25 
While there are not precise estimates of the proportion of cases resolved 
through plea bargaining, there is evidence that most are.26 Of offenders 
who pleaded guilty in federal criminal cases in 2017, almost half 
received sentences below the applicable sentencing guideline range, 
and close to sixty percent of these lower sentences were requested by 
the government.27  
Although the prevalence of plea bargaining is undisputed, the 
practice’s merits are widely debated. Proponents of the practice stress 
its administrative convenience and argue that the outcomes are fair.28 
 
 21. Glenn R. Schmitt & Cassandra Syckes, Overview of Federal Criminal Cases: Fiscal Year 
2017, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION 5 (June 2018) https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-
and-publications/research-publications/2018/FY17_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9E36-W9ZY]. 
 22. See Sean Rosenmerkel, Mathew Durose & Donald Farole, Felony Sentences in State 
Courts, 2006 – Statistical Tables, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 1, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/fssc06st.pdf (last updated Nov. 2010) [https://perma.cc/9E36-W9ZY]. 
 23. See Mona Lynch, Booker Circumvention? Adjudication Strategies in the Advisory 
Sentencing Guidelines Era, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 59, 91 n.120 (2019) (“Pleading 
‘straight up’ means that the defendant pleads guilty to the charges as they are presented in the 
charging document, without entering into any plea agreement with the government.”). 
 24. See Alschuler, supra note 10, at 3 (explaining that, broadly defined, plea bargains involve 
a defendant’s entry of a guilty plea in exchange for some form of “official concessions”). 
 25. See Lucian E. Dervan, Bargained Justice: The History and Psychology of Plea Bargaining 
and the Trial Penalty, 31 FED. SENT’G REP. 239, 239 (2019) (“Although the exact number of plea 
bargains is elusive, it is estimated that approximately 75 percent of such pleas of guilty are induced 
by threats of further punishment if a defendant proceeds to trial, by offers of leniency in return for 
waiving the constitutionally protected right to trial, or both.”). 
 26. See Schmitt & Syckes, supra note 21, at 5 (examining the disposition of cases in 2017).   
 27. See id. (explaining that below-guideline sentences were typically requested “because the 
defendant had provided substantial assistance to the government or had agreed to have his or her 
case handled as part of an Early Disposition Program”).   
 28. See, e.g., Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of “Bargain Justice”, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
509, 512–14, 523 (1979) (referencing the “positive aspects of less formal adjudication procedures”); 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 309–17 
(1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure] (extolling the virtues of plea bargains 
because it enables “parties [to] save the costs of trials” and because “[d]efendants presumably 
prefer the lower sentences to the exercise of their trial rights or they would not strike the deals”); 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1975 (1992) 
[hereinafter Easterbrook, Compromise] (justifying plea bargaining because it “helps defendants”); 
William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 66–69 (1971) 
(theorizing that defendants only enter into plea bargains when it maximizes their utility); Edward 
A. Ruttenburg, Plea Bargaining Analytically—The Nash Solution to the Landes Model, 7 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 323, 353 (1979) (“Plea bargaining should be accepted openly as a system which can 
accomplish the goals of justice as completely as can a pure trial system . . . .”); Robert E. Scott & 
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Opponents, on the other hand, contend that plea bargaining 
undermines the accuracy and fairness of criminal prosecutions.29 This 
Note focuses on one aspect of the plea bargaining system—the effect of 
communicating collateral consequences during plea bargain 
negotiations on decisions to waive trial and plead guilty—and explores 
its theoretical and practical consequences for defendants.30  
B. Collateral Consequences 
Collateral consequences consist of a broad array of restrictions, 
limitations, and barriers that—though not embedded in the criminal 
code as part of the formal criminal penalty—individuals face as a result 
of conviction.31 Some are imposed informally by third parties, such as 
employers and potential landlords.32 This Note, however, focuses on the 
many collateral consequences that are formally imposed by the 
government and embedded throughout civil codes.33 
The practice of imposing far-reaching, state-sanctioned 
collateral consequences on individuals convicted of a crime is not a new 
phenomenon. In 1937, eighteen states had “civil death” statutes that 
severely restricted the civil rights of convicted persons after 
 
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1910 (1992) (arguing that 
plea bargains are “paradigmatically value-enhancing bargains.”).  
 29. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 
50 (1968) (decrying plea bargaining as producing irrational results); Bibas, supra note 4, at 1123 
(criticizing the Supreme Court for failing to “cultivate rules tailored to make [plea] bargaining fair 
and substantively just”).  
 30. See infra Parts II, III.  
 31. See Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 379 (2001) (explaining that states “impose a 
wide range of disabilities on those who have been convicted of crimes, even after their release”); 
Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1946) (recognizing that “[a] felon customarily suffers 
the loss of substantial rights”); Natalie Goulette & James Frank, Examining Criminal Justice 
Practitioners’ Views on Collateral Consequences Policy, 43 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 724, 725–26 (2018) 
(“These additional restrictions can limit offenders’ civil, parental, and spousal rights.”).   
 32. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV 1103, 1104 
(2013) (explaining that absent formal sanctions, “a conviction also has a very negative impact on 
individuals’ job and housing prospects”); Michelle Natividad Rodriguez & Maurice Emsellem, 65 
Million “Need Not Apply”: The Case for Reforming Criminal Background Checks for Employment, 
NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT (2011) https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/65 
_Million_Need_Not_Apply.pdf [https://perma.cc/EFD2-QHVS] (detailing the prevalence of hiring 
limitations for individuals with criminal records). For a model of how informal sanctions function 
in conjunction with the criminal justice system, see Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. 
Reinganum, Informal Sanctions on Prosecutors and Defendants and the Disposition of Criminal 
Cases, 32 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 359 (2015).  
 33. See generally Collateral Consequences Inventory, supra note 8 (consisting of an expansive, 
searchable database categorizes collateral consequences by jurisdiction, the area of life affected, 
the type of offense, and whether the law applies automatically or at the discretion of a government 
agent). Examples of collateral consequences include ineligibility for federal benefits, revocation of 
the right to vote, and loss of professional licensure. See id. 
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incarceration, and additional states restricted some civil rights of 
convicted persons without a formal statute.34 During the mid-twentieth 
century, such laws became increasingly unpopular and less common; in 
fact, in 1983, the American Bar Association predicted that collateral 
sanctions were heading towards “extinction.”35 But that prediction 
proved false. Even as severe civil death statutes became scarce, 
collateral consequences were embedded in noncriminal statutes.36  
Today, people convicted of felonies and most misdemeanors face 
an expansive list of collateral consequences embedded “not in the penal 
code but in state and federal gun-ownership and voting laws, juror-
qualification standards, professional-licensure requirements, [and] 
entitlement-eligibility rules.”37 The American Bar Association 
Collateral Consequences Inventory contains close to forty-five thousand 
consequences across U.S. jurisdictions.38 The more than one thousand 
federally imposed collateral consequences include limits and outright 
bans on access to federal housing,39 Social Security benefits,40 student 
loans,41 and federal employment.42 State-level collateral consequences 
are even more expansive—they include revocation of the right to vote,43 
revocation or denial of professional and occupational licensures (for 
 
 34. Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass 
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790, 1796 (2012) (articulating the concept of civil death as 
more or less a complete extinction of civil rights).  
 35. Id. at 1798.  
 36. Id. at 1799. Although it is not entirely clear why civil death statutes were unpopular and 
repealed while piecemeal collateral consequences provisions were simultaneously incorporated 
into civil codes, the wholesale nature of civil death statutes may have made them particularly 
prone to opposition while individual provisions appeared more proportionate to an offense.  
 37. Alec C. Ewald & Marnie Smith, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions in 
American Courts: The View from the State Bench, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 145, 145 (2008).  
 38. See Collateral Consequences Inventory, supra note 8. 
 39. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (2019) (allowing for the termination of a PHA lease “for criminal 
activity”). See generally Corrine A. Carey, No Second Chance: People with Criminal Records Denied 
Access to Public Housing, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 545 (2005) (describing America’s exclusion of 
individuals with criminal history from subsidized housing). 
 40. See 21 U.S.C. § 862a (2012) (providing for the denial of benefits based on specific drug-
related convictions).  
 41. See 34 C.F.R. § 668.40 (2019) (providing for ineligibility for federally backed student loans 
for drug convictions). 
 42. See 5 U.S.C. § 3113 (2012) (providing for restrictions on federal employment for certain 
bribery and drug-related convictions).  
 43. Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, 
Tennessee, Virginia, and Wyoming all deny convicted felons the right to vote indefinitely. Felon 
Voting Rights, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 14, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx [https://perma.cc/4ADT-9YRL].  
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example, a medical or barber’s license),44 ineligibility for food stamps,45 
restrictions on adoption,46 and ineligibility for public office,47 among 
innumerable others.48 Thus, the formal sanctions of a conviction are 
only part of its cost. Often “collateral consequences . . . are the harshest 
sanctions because they limit opportunity, can be timeless, and inhibit 
full reentry.”49  
Because courts generally regard collateral consequences as 
nonpunitive, they “have imposed few limits on creation and 
implementation of collateral consequences.”50 The Supreme Court has 
condoned collateral consequences related to occupational ineligibility,51 
deportation,52 sex offender registrations,53 civil commitment,54 voter 
 
 44. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 626A.20 (2018) (providing for the suspension or revocation of licenses 
“to practice a profession or to carry on a business” for certain communications-related convictions); 
W. VA. CODE § 21-1B-7 (2018) (providing for the suspension or revocation of professional and 
occupational licenses for convictions of fraud and labor laws).  
 45. E.g., IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 16.03.04.287 (2018) (restricting food stamp eligibility for 
drug-related felonies); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-308 (2018) (restricting food stamp eligibility for 
drug-related convictions).  
 46. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 346-19.7 (2019) (providing for denial of adoption application based 
on criminal conviction); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-26.8 (West 2019) (restricting eligibility for 
adoption based on criminal convictions).  
 47. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 112.317 (2018) (preventing individuals convicted of crimes involving 
fraud, dishonesty, misrepresentation, or money-laundering from holding public office); 17 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 17-23-6 (2018) (preventing individuals convicted of election-related offenses from holding 
public office).  
 48. See Collateral Consequences Inventory, supra note 8 (providing a comprehensive listing 
of collateral consequences by jurisdiction). 
 49. Brian M. Murray, Are Collateral Consequences Deserved?, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1031, 
1032 (2020). 
 50. Chin, supra note 34, at 1806; see Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 
(1963) (establishing a balancing test to determine if a law is criminal punishment or civil 
regulation); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 195–98 (1898) (holding that a provision 
prohibiting those convicted of a felony from holding a medical license was not ex post facto criminal 
punishment, but merely made use of conviction of a felony as evidence for disqualification). 
 51. See Hawker, 170 U.S. at 197–200 (“[S]uch legislation is not to be regarded as a mere 
imposition of additional penalty, but as prescribing the qualifications for the duties to be 
discharged and the position to be filled, and naming . . . appropriate evidence of such 
qualifications.”).  
 52. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530–31 (1954) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause 
does not apply to deportation because it is not punitive even if it “deprive[s] a man ‘of all that 
makes life worth living’ ” (quoting Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922))).  
 53. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 104–06 (2003) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause does 
not apply to sex offender registration because the statute requiring registration was regulatory, 
civil, and nonpunitive). 
 54. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause 
did not apply to involuntary confinement after conviction for indecent liberties with a child because 
the statute was not punitive). 
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disenfranchisement,55 and firearm possession.56 Subjecting collateral 
consequences to rational basis review, lower courts have upheld 
collateral consequences on cost-saving,57 public safety,58 and public 
confidence59 grounds. Collateral consequences thus represent a 
widespread, court-sanctioned, and costly result of conviction, but when 
defendants are considering entering a guilty plea, such consequences 
need not be communicated to them.  
C. The Supreme Court, Plea Bargaining,  
and Collateral Consequences 
Despite the Supreme Court’s promulgation of exacting 
procedures for jury trials, the Court’s approach towards plea bargaining 
has remained quite deferential.60 In the seminal case on plea 
bargaining, the 1970 Brady v. United States decision, the Supreme 
Court held that plea bargaining was constitutional.61 It recognized that 
the government “encourages pleas of guilty at every important step in 
the criminal process” and refused to hold that a guilty plea is compelled 
and invalid when motivated by a defendant’s desire to accept the 
certainty of a lesser penalty rather than risk a heavier sentence at 
trial.62 The Court highlighted the mutual benefits of plea bargaining for 
defendants and for the government: defendants with little chance of 
acquittal are relieved of the “burdens of trial” and “the correctional 
 
 55. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54–55 (1974) (finding that loss of voting rights 
related to felony conviction was not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
 56. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (noting that “nothing in our 
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms 
by felons”).  
 57. See Houston v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1357, 1363–64 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that “the 
conservation of funds constitutes a rational basis on which to deny assistance to convicted felons 
and sex offenders”).  
 58. See Rinehart v. La. Dep’t of Corr., No. 93-5624, 1994 WL 395054, at *1 (5th Cir. July 7, 
1994) (per curiam) (holding that employment prohibitions are rationally related to security and 
safety).  
 59. See Parker v. Lyons, 757 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that an Illinois statute 
restricting felons from elected office is rationally related to the legitimate state interest in ensuring 
public confidence in elected officials). 
 60. See Bibas, supra note 4, at 1119 (“[T]he Supreme Court has promulgated exacting 
procedures to regulate jury trials. . . . But even as trial procedures hypertrophied, plea bargaining 
remained all but unregulated, a free market that sometimes resembled a Turkish bazaar.”). 
 61. See 397 U.S. 742, 751–52 (1970): 
[Plea bargaining] is inherent in the criminal law and its administration because guilty 
pleas are not constitutionally forbidden, because the criminal law characteristically 
extends to judge or jury a range of choice in setting the sentence in individual cases, 
and because both the State and the defendant often find it advantageous to preclude 
the possibility of the maximum penalty authorized by law. 
 62. Id. at 750–51.   
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process can begin immediately,” while the government can allocate 
limited resources to cases in which there “is a substantial issue of the 
defendant’s guilt.”63  
Because guilty pleas constitute a waiver of the constitutional 
right to trial, due process requires judges to ensure that pleas are 
intelligent and voluntary.64 The bar for what constitutes a voluntary 
and intelligent guilty plea is low, however. In Brady, the Court 
concluded that judges’ due process obligations are met when they 
ensure that defendants understand the “direct consequences” of 
entering a guilty plea and do not face threats, misrepresentations, or 
bribes.65 Thus, at plea colloquies, judges must “explain only the direct 
consequences of a plea, such as the minimum and maximum sentences 
and any fine, forfeiture, or probation.”66 Further, the Court 
subsequently held that prosecutorial threats to bring more severe 
charges if a defendant rejects a plea offer do not vitiate the 
voluntariness of a guilty plea because there is no “element of 
punishment or retaliation” in the “give-and-take negotiation common in 
plea bargaining between the prosecution and defense.”67 And, as 
recently as 2002, in United States v. Ruiz, the Court determined there 
is no constitutional due process right to impeachment and affirmative 
defense information during plea bargaining.68 
Additionally, in contrast with trial practice, the Court has 
routinely upheld the waivability of rights in the plea bargaining 
 
 63. Id. at 752.  
 64. See id. at 748 (“Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be 
knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely 
consequences.”); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242–43 (1969) (finding that a trial judge may 
not accept a guilty plea “without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary”).  
 65. 397 U.S. at 755 (adopting the Fifth Circuit standard):  
A plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the 
actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own 
counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper 
harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or 
perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship 
to the prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes).  
(quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev’d on other 
grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)).  
 66. Bibas, supra note 4, at 1130; see also Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (adopting the standard that 
a defendant need only be made aware of the plea’s “direct consequences” (quoting Shelton, 246 
F.2d at 572 n.2)). The Rule 11 plea process builds on constitutional requirements for guilty pleas 
established in Brady and Boykin, requiring that during plea colloquies the judge need mention 
only the rights being waived, the nature of the charges, the maximum and minimum penalties, 
and some factual basis for the plea. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (establishing the federal model for plea 
bargaining, which is followed by many states).   
 67. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362–63 (1978) (quoting Parker v. North Carolina, 
397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part)). 
 68. See 536 U.S. 622, 629–30 (2002). 
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context. In United States v. Mezzanatto, the Court emphasized the 
strong presumption that all rights are waivable in plea bargaining.69 
More recently, in Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakely v. Washington, 
the Court held that facts admitted by defendants who plead guilty are 
exempt from the Sixth Amendment guarantees that the jury find all 
facts that aggravate maximum sentences and sentences under 
sentencing guidelines.70 In fact, “[m]ost guilty pleas forfeit most rights 
that defendants could otherwise appeal,” and “[d]efendants often waive” 
additional rights, including “the right to appeal itself.”71 Defendants 
must merely be informed of the rights they are waiving.72  
In theory, the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel helps 
ensure that defendants make knowing, intelligent guilty pleas.73 The 
same year Brady was decided (1970), in McMann v. Richardson, the 
Court held that defendants have a right to competent legal advice 
regarding guilty pleas.74 Although the Court explained that effective 
assistance of counsel is based on whether the actions and conduct of an 
attorney came “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys 
in criminal cases,” it did not provide guidance on what this standard 
means in a guilty plea context.75 Lacking guidance, lower courts 
developed and relied on a test incorporating the “direct consequences” 
language in Brady. Courts distinguished between direct and collateral 
consequences and held that when counsel advise defendants on the 
direct and automatic consequences of a guilty plea, they satisfy the 
effective counsel requirement.76  
 
 69. See 513 U.S. 196, 200–03 (1995) (holding that defendants may waive rules that exclude 
from evidence statements made during plea negotiations).  
 70. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 310 (2004) (extending Apprendi to facts that 
aggravate sentences under sentencing guidelines and emphasizing that defendants can waive 
Apprendi rights in plea bargaining); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488–90 (2000) 
(exempting facts admitted by defendants from its holding that the Sixth Amendment guarantees 
jury findings of all facts that aggravate maximum sentences). 
 71. Bibas, supra note 4, at 1123; see also United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 575–76 (1989) 
(holding that a guilty plea barred a later double jeopardy claim that relied on additional evidence); 
People v. Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d 1022, 1024–26 (N.Y. 1989) (allowing waiver of the right to appeal).  
 72. See Bibas, supra note 4, at 1124 (“[D]efendants need know only that they are giving up 
their trial rights.”).  
 73. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).  
 74. See 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970) (holding that “a defendant’s plea of guilty based on 
reasonably competent advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack on the ground that counsel 
may have misjudged the admissibility of the defendant’s confession”).  
 75. Id. at 771. 
 76. See, e.g., Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973) 
(distinguishing between direct and collateral consequences by examining whether the consequence 
was a “definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant’s 
punishment”); Hutchison v. United States, 450 F.2d 930, 931 (10th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (holding 
that the defense attorney’s failure to advise on an administrative punishment, in addition to the 
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In 1985, the Court extended the two-pronged test for ineffective 
counsel, first developed as a trial right in Strickland v. Washington, to 
guilty pleas.77 Strickland provides a two-pronged test for ineffective 
assistance claims: (1) whether “counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) whether counsel’s 
“deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”78 Under the first prong, 
reasonableness is considered in relation to “prevailing professional 
norms” such as the American Bar Association standards.79 Under the 
second prong, there is prejudice when “there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.”80  
In the case extending Strickland to guilty pleas, Hill v. Lockhart, 
the Court clarified that there is prejudice in the plea context when there 
is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the 
defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial.”81 Because the Hill defendant failed to satisfy the 
prejudice prong, the Court did not address the question of 
reasonableness in the plea context.82 And overwhelmingly, lower courts 
continued to apply the test distinguishing between direct and collateral 
consequences in determinations of ineffective assistance of counsel.83  
In a watershed decision in 2010, the Court directly confronted 
the issue of counsel’s duty to advise clients about the possible 
consequences of a guilty plea.84 In Padilla v. Kentucky, the defendant, 
a U.S. permanent resident, was charged with felony trafficking in 
marijuana.85 He asked his lawyer whether pleading guilty would lead 
to deportation and was incorrectly assured that he need not worry about 
deportation.86 The Court held that, before a guilty plea, defense counsel 
 
criminal punishment, did not constitute ineffective assistance because it was not a “definite 
practical consequence of the plea”).  
 77. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (applying the Strickland test to guilty pleas); 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (determining whether counsel was 
ineffective based on (1) whether “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness” and (2) whether counsel’s “deficient performance prejudiced the defense”).  
 78. 466 U.S. at 687–88.  
 79. Id. at 690. 
 80. Id. at 694.  
 81. 474 U.S. at 59.  
 82. Id. at 60. 
 83. See Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the 
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 699 (2002) (explaining that “eleven federal 
circuits, more than thirty states, and the District of Columbia” still rely on the distinction between 
direct and collateral consequences).  
 84. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 85. Id. at 359.  
 86. Id.  
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must advise clients about the civil collateral consequence of deportation 
to satisfy the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel.87 In reaching 
this decision, the Court emphasized the “weight of prevailing 
professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her 
client regarding the deportation risk” and the ease of determining the 
consequence of deportation.88 
Although the Court noted that it had “never applied a distinction 
between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of 
constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance,’ ” it delayed 
consideration of whether the distinction is appropriate because 
“deportation is intimately related to the criminal process.”89 Since 
issuing the decision in Padilla, however, the Court has not revisited 
this question or extended the requirement to communicate other 
collateral consequences. Lower courts therefore continue to apply the 
direct/collateral consequences distinction.90  
The Supreme Court, however, recently extended additional plea 
bargain protections in a related area. In Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri 
v. Frye, a pair of 2012 decisions, the Court considered whether a 
defendant’s right to counsel was violated when the defendant received 
deficient advice during pretrial plea bargaining that led to severe 
consequences.91 The majority affirmed a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of counsel during pretrial negotiations, 
focusing on the Strickland prejudice test and casting further doubt on 
the continued use of the test distinguishing collateral and direct 
consequences used by most lower courts.92 Importantly, in rendering 
the decision in Frye, the Court explicitly denounced the notion that 
regulated jury trials provide adequate protection for defendants at the 
plea negotiation stage, stating:  
Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions 
are the result of guilty pleas . . . The reality is that plea bargains have become so central 
to the administration of the criminal justice system that defense counsel have 
 
 87. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360. 
 88. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 357.  
 89. Id. at 357, 365. 
 90. See, e.g., United States v. Youngs, 687 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that a guilty 
plea is valid when the defendant was unaware of the collateral consequence of civil commitment); 
United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 382 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that a guilty plea is valid 
where defendants are unaware of collateral consequences such as the loss of benefits).  
 91. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 138–39 (2012) (noting that defendant’s counsel neglected 
to communicate a plea offer proposed by the prosecution to the defendant and the Supreme Court 
found that counsel has an effective assistance of counsel duty to communicate such offers); Lafler 
v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 161–68 (2012) (stating that defendant went to trial and was convicted 
after counsel advised against accepting a plea offer “on the grounds he could not be convicted at 
trial,” which the Court deemed ineffective assistance of counsel). 
 92. See Frye, 566 U.S. at 147–49; Lafler, 566 U.S. at 166–67. 
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responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be met to render 
the adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal 
process at critical stages. Because ours ‘is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system 
of trials,’ it is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that 
inoculates any errors in the pretrial process.93 
Thus, although the Court has historically treated plea 
bargaining as outside the scope of many constitutional protections 
afforded to defendants during jury trials, recently it has begun taking 
steps to provide greater protections to defendants convicted through 
plea bargaining.  
II. A REALITY CHECK ON THE DOMINANT THEORY OF PLEA BARGAINING 
A. The Shadow of a Trial Theory 
In part, the Court’s hands-off approach to plea bargaining 
reflects an underlying “shadow of a trial” theory that mirrors 
settlement theory in civil cases. Conventional settlement theory posits 
that litigants bargain toward settlement in the shadow of expected trial 
outcomes.94 The basic model predicts that rational parties forecast the 
expected outcome of a trial and reach a bargain that leaves both sides 
better off by splitting the saved costs of trial.95 For example, a tort 
plaintiff who suffered $100,000 in damages and anticipates that they 
have a seventy-five percent chance of winning at trial would be willing 
to settle for $75,000 minus the expected expense of going to trial. The 
defendant in the case, meanwhile, may anticipate that the plaintiff has 
a seventy percent chance of winning at trial and will be willing to settle 
for $70,000 plus the expected costs of trial. Assuming the costs of going 
to trial are $3,000, the parties can settle for between $75,000 − $3,000 
and $70,000 + $3,000, or $72,000 and $73,000.  
 
 93. Frye, 566 U.S. at 143–44 (citations omitted).  
 94. See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under 
Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982).  
 95. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 
2464 (2004). Priest & Klein, supra note 94, at 11–13, provide a detailed model of the settlement 
decision. At its most basic, two parties will settle when the plaintiff’s minimum ask, A, is less than 
the defendant’s maximum offer, B. 𝐴 =  𝑃 𝐽 − 𝐶 + 𝑆 , where 𝑃 (𝐽) is the plaintiff’s expected value 
of the case (the plaintiff’s estimated probability of a favorable judgement multiplied by the size of 
the judgement, J), 𝐶  is the litigation cost to the plaintiff, and 𝑆  is the settlement cost to the 
plaintiff. Similarly, 𝐵 = 𝑃 (𝐽) + 𝐶 − 𝑆 , where 𝑃 (𝐽) is the defendant’s expected costs of the case 
(the defendant’s estimated probability of a favorable judgement for the plaintiff multiplied by the 
size of the judgement), 𝐶  is the litigation cost to the defendant, and 𝑆  is the settlement cost to 
the defendant. Thus, the parties will settle when 𝑃 (𝐽) − 𝐶 + 𝑆 <  𝑃 (𝐽) + 𝐶 − 𝑆 . 
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The same theoretical framework has been adapted to the 
criminal context.96 A number of scholars have argued that plea 
bargaining is simply another iteration of bargaining in the shadow of a 
trial.97 In the criminal context, the prosecutor and defendant forecast 
the expected outcome of going to trial and reach a bargain when the 
prosecutor’s sentence offer is lower than the defendant’s expected 
sentence at trial.98 The prosecutor’s minimum sentence demand is 
determined by the product of the sentence upon conviction at trial and 
the anticipated likelihood of obtaining a conviction. The maximum 
sentence a defendant will be willing to accept is similarly determined 
by the product of the sentence upon conviction at trial and his 
anticipated likelihood of being convicted (excluding any monetary costs 
present when a defendant is paying his own legal expenses). When the 
maximum sentence a defendant is willing to accept is longer than the 
prosecutor’s minimum sentence demand, a bargain may be reached.99 
In an effort to minimize postconviction sanctions, a defendant will 
weigh the expected sentence at trial—the product of the expected 
sentence at trial and the perceived likelihood of conviction—against the 
deal offered by the prosecutor.100  
For example, consider a defendant charged with a crime that 
carries a ten-year potential sentence. If the prosecutor perceives a fifty 
percent chance of winning at trial, making the expected sentence at 
trial five years (.5 x 10 years), he would be willing to offer the defendant 
a plea bargain for between five and ten years. If the defendant perceives 
a 70 percent chance of being convicted at trial, making the expected 
sentence at trial seven years (.7 x 10 years), he would be willing to 
accept a plea bargain for any sentence less than seven years. Thus, the 
prosecutor and defendant may strike a deal for a sentence between five 
and seven years. As the likelihood of conviction at trial decreases, the 
discount offered in a plea bargain must increase to incentivize a 
defendant to accept the offer. Continuing the previous example, if the 
defendant anticipates a thirty percent chance of conviction, he will not 
accept a plea bargain that involves more than a three-year sentence. 
 
 96. For a critical account of the functional differences between settlements in the civil and 
criminal contexts, see Russell M. Gold, Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Civilizing 
Criminal Settlements, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1607, 1609 (2017) (noting that “[t]he civil system facilitates 
settlement in a very different way” than the criminal system).  
 97. See, e.g., Church, supra note 28, at 512–14, 523; Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra 
note 28, at 309–17; Easterbrook, Compromise, supra note 28, at 1969–72; Ruttenburg, supra note 
28, at 353; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 28, at 1910. 
 98. See Bibas, supra note 95, at 2464–66.  
 99. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 28, at 297.  
 100. Bibas, supra note 4, at 1119; Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 28, at 297. 
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But, if he anticipates a ninety percent chance of conviction, he will 
accept any offer for less than nine years. 
Importantly, proponents of the shadow of a trial theory endorse 
plea bargains because they expect the resulting plea bargains roughly 
to reflect the outcomes that would occur at trial, therefore ensuring that 
plea bargains allocate punishment fairly.101 They contend that strict 
regulation of plea bargaining is unnecessary because highly regulated 
trials serve as the backdrop for plea negotiations and are thus 
incorporated into the negotiations.102 A defendant considering a plea 
bargain theoretically bases his perceived chance of conviction on the 
chance of conviction in a highly regulated, fair trial, and thus he should 
not be willing to accept an offer that deviates greatly from that 
perceived chance of conviction.103 Proponents also argue that plea 
bargains calibrate sentences to culpability, allow prosecutors to pursue 
the most dangerous criminals, and more effectively mirror trial 
outcomes than settlements in civil cases because sentencing is more 
predictable.104  
There are reasons to doubt that this model accurately reflects 
reality, however. It assumes that individuals act rationally and on the 
basis of complete information, but psychologists and behavioral 
economists have amassed evidence that people—including 
professionals in the criminal justice system—fail to act in strictly 
rational ways.105 Further, in the name of simplification, the model 
excludes many factors that are important in the decision to plead guilty 
and waive trial, such as poor lawyering, agency costs, and bail and 
pretrial detention rules.106 Consequently, some scholars have criticized 
 
 101. Bibas, supra note 4, at 1124–25.  
 102. Id. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. 
 105. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 95, at 2496–2526 (discussing the psychological pitfalls in plea 
bargaining); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 
86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001) (demonstrating that judges are susceptible to anchoring, framing, 
hindsight bias, the representativeness heuristic, and egocentric biases that produce systematic 
errors in judgement); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974) (explaining the biases leading to use of 
representativeness, availability, and adjustment and anchoring heuristics). Proponents of the 
shadow of a trial theory sometimes acknowledge the theory’s shortcomings, but often in passing 
and without due consideration of the consequences of its shortcomings. See Easterbrook, Criminal 
Procedure, supra note 98, at 309–17 (acknowledging market failure challenges to plea bargaining, 
such as risk preferences, time discounting, financial limitations, and agency costs, but dismissing 
them as relatively unimportant); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 28, at 1925–28, 1938–39 
(acknowledging some important caveats, such as framing, poor judgement, and risk preferences, 
but dismissing them). 
 106. See Bibas, supra note 95, at 2469–96 (discussing the structural distortions in plea 
bargaining).  
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the shadow of a trial theory for failing to accurately explain observed 
plea bargaining behavior; these scholars argue that a nontrivial portion 
of guilty pleas are entered by factually innocent defendants.107 As 
discussed below, the failure to communicate collateral consequences to 
defendants creates both structural and behavioral problems for the 
shadow of the trial theory and suggests that failure to communicate 
such consequences distorts outcomes.  
B. Reality Check on the Shadow of a Trial Theory 
The Supreme Court’s decision not to require communication of 
collateral consequences violates the assumptions of the shadow of a 
trial theory because it enables uninformed and irrational plea 
acceptances. Assuming the shadow of a trial theory of plea bargaining 
is appropriate, complete information about the costs of entering a guilty 
plea is necessary for defendants to appropriately weigh the merits of 
accepting an offer and going to trial.108 But even assuming a defendant 
has some knowledge of collateral consequences, failure to disclose them 
during plea bargaining negotiations implicates psychological and 
behavioral economic departures from rational decisionmaking because 
individuals generally are loss averse, give priority to salient 
information, and frame decisions narrowly.109  
 
 107. See David S. Abrams, Is Pleading Really a Bargain?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 200, 220 (2011) (using administrative data to determine that the value of a plea 
deal is typically worse than the expected trial outcome); John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The 
Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 175–
80 (2014) (providing several reasons why innocent defendants enter guilty pleas); Vanessa A. 
Edkins & Lucian E. Dervan, Freedom Now or a Future Later: Pitting the Lasting Implications of 
Collateral Consequences Against Pretrial Detention in Decisions to Plead Guilty, 24 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 204, 205 (2018) [hereinafter Edkins & Dervan, Freedom] (testing whether the shadow 
of a trial theory describes defendant decisions using a vignette study); Vanessa A. Edkins & Lucian 
E. Dervan, Pleading Innocents: Laboratory Evidence of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 21 
CURRENT RES. IN SOC. PSYCHOL. 14, 18 (2013) [hereinafter Edkins & Dervan, Pleading Innocents] 
(finding in an experiment that fifty-six percent of innocent participants preferred accepting a plea 
deal); Michael O. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal Courts, 
89 HARV. L. REV. 293, 299–300 (1975) (finding that more than two-thirds of marginal plea bargain 
defendants would be acquitted or dismissed if they were to contest their cases). But see Shawn D. 
Bushway & Allison D. Redlich, Is Plea Bargaining in the “Shadow of the Trial” a Mirage?, 28 J. 
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 437 (2012) (finding that the theory was supported by evidence 
combining statistical modelling with trial evidence to determine whether plea bargained cases 
would have had harsher outcomes at trial).  
 108. See Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 28, at 297 (discussing negotiations 
between the prosecutor and the defendant).  
 109. See generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach 
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (describing violations of assumptions of 
neoclassical economics due to bounded rationality, bounded self-interest, and bounded willpower 
and introducing behavioral approaches to law and economics); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral 
Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. 
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1. Incomplete Information 
The shadow of a trial theory of plea bargaining assumes that 
defendants have the requisite information needed to determine 
whether the cost-minimizing course of action is going to trial or 
pleading guilty.110 When only the immediate, direct consequences of a 
conviction are communicated to defendants, they are likely to 
miscalculate the cost of pleading guilty to that offense.111 For example, 
consider a defendant facing a ten-year sentence if convicted at trial. If 
he anticipates a fifty percent chance of conviction at trial, the true 
expected cost of going to trial is a five-year sentence (.5 x 10 years) and 
the discounted cost of collateral consequences (.5 x the cost of collateral 
consequences). If the prosecutor offers him a plea bargain for a four-
year sentence, the true cost of the offer is the four-year sentence and 
the total cost of collateral consequences. Without information about the 
costly consequences of collateral sanctions, the defendant cannot 
appropriately weigh the relative merits of the two options and will 
underestimate the cost of a guilty plea. Consequently, even assuming a 
rational model is appropriate, failure to communicate collateral 
consequences to defendants distorts the shadow of a trial theory.    
2. Irrational Decisionmaking 
Failure to communicate collateral consequences to defendants 
also implicates deviations from the rationality assumptions of the 
shadow of a trial theory. Behavioral law and economics concepts of loss 
aversion, salience, and narrow framing all suggest that the shadow of a 
trial theory of plea bargaining may neglect important considerations 
relevant to the communication of collateral consequences.112  
 
L. REV. 1499 (1998) (providing an overview of the legal literature incorporating behavioral 
economic and psychology concepts). 
 110. See Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 28, at 297 (discussing negotiations 
between the prosecutor and the defendant). 
 111. See, e.g., United States v. Youngs, 687 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that a guilty 
plea was valid when the defendant was unaware of the collateral consequence of civil 
commitment); United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 382 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that a guilty 
plea is valid even though the defendant was unaware of collateral consequences such as the loss 
of benefits); Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973) (distinguishing 
between direct and collateral consequences by examining whether the consequence was a “definite, 
immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment”); Hutchison 
v. United States, 450 F.2d 930, 931 (10th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (holding that the defense 
attorney’s failure to advise on an administrative punishment, in addition to the criminal 
punishment, did not constitute ineffective assistance because it was not a “definite practical 
consequence of the plea”). 
 112. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 279 (1979) (discussing loss aversion); see also Amos Tversky & Daniel 
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A critical insight of psychology and behavioral economics is that 
most people are loss averse, and often avoiding loss is more important 
to individuals than avoiding risk.113 Consequently, when making 
decisions under risk, individuals tend to be risk seeking with regard to 
losses and risk averse with regard to gains.114 With respect to plea 
bargaining, this suggests that a defendant who is weighing the sure 
losses associated with a guilty plea against the risky option of trial will 
prefer the latter. But, behavior is sensitive to both the degree of risk 
and the framing of a risky decision. In situations where there is a 
chance of an extremely large loss, individuals appear to prefer certain, 
smaller costs instead of risking the realization of the extreme loss.115 If 
the cost of conviction at trial is extremely high compared with the plea 
offer, defendants may instead accept the plea bargain despite the sure 
loss. Again, without communication of collateral consequences, 
however, the defendant is likely misperceiving the costs of pleading 
guilty as lower than they are. If collateral consequences are 
communicated, the perceived difference between trial outcomes and 
plea acceptance may shrink and result in the defendant choosing trial. 
Further, because individuals prefer certain outcomes with regard to 
gains, if a plea bargain is framed as a gain, defendants are likely to be 
more prone to accept the offer.116 Thus, when a plea bargain is framed 
as the benefit of fewer years of incarceration as opposed to being framed 
with regard to the costly collateral consequences after release because 
those consequences are not communicated, defendants may be more 
likely to accept a plea offer.  
The concepts of salience and narrow framing also provide 
important insights for plea bargaining decisions. Salience refers to the 
observation that individuals are more likely to focus on items or 
information that are more prominent and ignore those that are less so, 
creating a bias in favor of things that are striking and perceptible.117 
 
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251, S258 (1986) 
[hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice] (discussing loss aversion). 
 113. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 105. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id.  at 274–85 (discussing risk theory); see also Milton Friedman & L. J. Savage, The 
Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279, 279–80, 300 (1948) (noting that 
generalizations about risk aversion hold true for moderate degrees of risk, but perhaps not small 
or large risks); Marieke Huysentruyt & Daniel Read, How Do People Value Extended Warranties? 
Evidence from Two Field Surveys, 40 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 197 (2010) (explaining decisions to 
purchase expensive warranties as an insurance policy against an extreme loss). 
 116. See Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice, supra note 112, at S254–60 (demonstrating 
that framing decisions as gains induces individuals to favor certain outcomes over equivalent 
uncertain outcomes).   
 117. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 105 (discussing the heuristics “employed to assess 
probabilities and predict values”). See generally Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience 
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Narrow framing refers to the observation that individuals often 
consider decisions in isolation, rather than as a part of the bigger 
picture, and consequently fail to make the most advantageous 
combination of choices.118 With respect to collateral consequences, 
salience suggests that defendants are unlikely to consider collateral 
consequences when they are not explicitly disclosed even if they have 
some preexisting knowledge of the consequences. And, because the 
salient factor during plea negotiations is the sentence or charge, 
defendants may narrowly frame jail time and collateral consequences 
as individual decisions, rather than part of the whole, in deciding 
whether to accept a plea bargain. Thus, even assuming defendants are 
acting from a place of complete information—admittedly a bold 
assumption—failing to communicate collateral consequences may 
result in deviations from the shadow of a trial theory, leading to 
inaccurate or unfair results.  
III. AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF PLEA BARGAINING  
AND COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
A. Experiment Design and Hypotheses 
1. Experiment Design 
Although there is abundant scholarship on plea bargaining and 
collateral consequences considered separately,119 and some scholarship 
considering the relationship between the two,120 empirical research on 
 
and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145 (2009) (demonstrating that 
individuals are more sensitive to taxes when they are included in the posted price of a good rather 
than assessed at the register).  
 118. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 334–41 (2011) (explaining that 
individuals make individual decisions rather than in the aggregate to maximize utility and that 
such narrow framing results in deviations from rational utility maximization); Tversky & 
Kahneman, Rational Choice, supra note 112, at S255–56 (demonstrating that individuals will 
choose strictly dominated sets of options when presented separately).  
 119. E.g., Bibas, supra note 95; Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for 
Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153 (1999); Michael 
Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and 
Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623 (2006); Meghan 
Sacks & Alissa R. Ackerman, Pretrial Detention and Guilty Pleas: If They Cannot Afford Bail They 
Must Be Guilty, 25 CRIM. JUST. STUD. 265 (2012). 
 120. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 83 (contending that effective assistance of counsel should 
require communicating collateral consequences); Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: 
Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 
119, 167–93 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court should require communication of collateral 
consequences to protect the personal values that underlie a defendant’s decision whether to plead 
guilty and because such consequences overshadow direct penal sentences in criminal cases). 
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the relationship between the two is quite undeveloped.121 One reason 
for the dearth of empirical work is the absence of instructive 
observational data related to plea bargaining and collateral 
consequences. In the absence of observational data, this Note employs 
an experimental vignette study designed to elicit the effect of 
communicating collateral consequences on the decision to accept a plea 
bargain.122 
The vignette study developed for this Note expands on the work 
of Edkins and Dervan (2018), who found that communicating collateral 
consequences—loss of voting rights and loss of professional licensure—
did not affect decisions to plead guilty when the plea bargain involved 
no prison time.123 Like their study, each scenario in the present 
experiment revolves around a nurse charged with felony assault. This 
characterization is desirable for several reasons. First, felony 
convictions often carry collateral consequences that misdemeanor 
convictions do not. Second, loss of professional licensure is a common 
collateral consequence of felony conviction. And, third, felony assault 
carries potential sentences between one and twenty years—depending 
on the jurisdiction and the circumstances surrounding the crime—and 
therefore provides a realistic range of potential sentences. In contrast 
to the Edkins and Dervan study, this experiment tests the importance 
of collateral consequences in a situation where a plea bargain involves 
jail time, includes a more robust set of collateral consequences 
(including the loss of public benefits), and asks respondents to consider 
accepting a plea bargain in relation to increasingly severe sentences if 
convicted at trial.  
 
 121. See Edkins & Dervan, Freedom, supra note 107 (using an experimental vignette study to 
test the effects of communicating collateral consequences on plea acceptance. The author’s vignette 
study involved a single nurse charged with felony assault, a plea bargain involving no jail time, 
and communication about collateral consequences related to loss of voting rights and professional 
licensure); see also Stephanie Madon et al., Temporal Discounting: The Differential Effect of 
Proximal and Distal Consequences on Confession Decisions, 36 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 13 (2011) 
(finding in an experiment that participants altered how frequently they admitted to criminal 
behaviors during an interview to “avoid a proximal consequence even though doing so increased 
their risk of incurring a distal consequence”). 
 122. Experimental-vignette studies have become increasingly common in the legal literature 
to test whether inter- and intra-subject responses meaningfully differ across scenarios involving 
an issue of interest. See Christiane Atzmüller & Peter M. Steiner, Experimental Vignette Studies 
in Survey Research, 6 METHODOLOGY 128 (2010) (defining vignette experiments and describing 
their utility).  
 123. Edkins & Dervan, Freedom, supra note 107 (using an experimental vignette study to test 
the effects of communicating collateral consequences on plea acceptance. The author’s vignette 
study involved a single nurse charged with felony assault, a plea bargain involving no jail time, 
and communication about collateral consequences related to loss of voting rights and professional 
licensure).  
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Experimental subjects in the study were recruited via Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (mTurk) service.124 Subjects were compensated $0.70 
for about five minutes of their time. To ensure that participants were 
attentive during the experiment, the survey included an attention 
check question at the end and subjects who answered incorrectly were 
dropped from the sample used for analysis. Table 1 presents selected 
demographics of the final sample of 316 subjects who participated in 
the study. The sample was 62% male and 61% white. The average age 
of subjects was slightly under thirty-five. Forty-four percent of subjects 
had a household income of over $50,000. More than half of participants 
had a bachelor’s degree or higher education level. Sixteen percent of 
subjects reported that they had been arrested or charged with a crime, 
and 42% reported knowing somebody who has been charged with a 
felony. Three quarters of participants believe that criminal sentencing 
needs reform.  
 
TABLE 1: SAMPLE SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 




Income over $50k 0.44 
Bachelor’s Degree or Higher 0.63 
Arrested/Charged with a Crime 0.16 
Know a Felon 0.42 
Sentencing Reform Needed 0.75 
 
The study presented all subjects with the same basic underlying 
vignette. Subjects assumed the role of a single nurse charged with 
felony assault, who is not being detained before trial and is offered a 
plea deal involving a guaranteed three-month sentence.125 Each subject 
was randomly assigned to one of four conditions: (1) guilty and no 
 
 124. For a detailed discussion on the use of mTurk samples in legal decisionmaking studies, 
see David A. Hoffman, From Promise to Form: How Contracting Online Changes Consumers, 91 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1595 (2016). 
 125. Although most plea deals involve a recommended sentence, making the plea outcome less 
than one hundred percent certain, I chose to use a guaranteed sentence (similar to Edkins and 
Dervan). Using a guaranteed sentence prevents introducing differing perceptions about the 
likelihood of the recommendation being followed in respondent’s decisions.  Concerns about the 
generalizability of findings to recommended sentences are mitigated by research finding that the 
greatest predictor of a judge’s sentence is the recommendation of the prosecutor. See Eugenio 
Garrido Martín & Carmen Herrero Alonso, Influence of the Prosecutor’s Plea on the Judge’s 
Sentencing in Sexual Crimes: Hypothesis of the Theory of Anchoring by Tversky and Kahneman, in 
ADVANCES IN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS 215–26 (Redondo et al. eds., 
1997). 
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communication of collateral consequences, (2) guilty and 
communication of collateral consequences, (3) not guilty and no 
communication of collateral consequences, or (4) not guilty and 
communication of collateral consequences. Subjects assigned to one of 
the conditions in which collateral consequences were communicated 
were told that as a consequence of pleading guilty to the offense they 
would lose the right to vote, lose their nursing license, and no longer be 
eligible for federal benefits such as foods stamps and public housing. 
After reading the vignette, subjects were asked whether they 
would accept the proposed plea bargain when the sentence if convicted 
at trial was one, three, six, or ten years. After each decision, subjects 
were asked to state how confident they were in their decision on a scale 
from 0 to 100 percent. In all scenarios, after making decisions about 
whether to accept the plea bargain at each sentence level, subjects were 
asked to rank factors that contributed to their decisions on a scale of 
one to five, where one represented no consideration and five 
represented great importance. The five factors that the subjects ranked 
were: their guilt or innocence, the length of jail time, the desire to put 
the issue behind them, the chance of losing their nursing license, and 
the chance of losing other benefits.  
At the end of the survey, subjects were asked about demographic 
information, including age, gender, race and ethnicity, household 
income, and educational background. Additionally, subjects were asked 
whether they regularly drive more than ten miles per hour over the 
speed limit, whether they have been arrested or charged with a crime, 
whether they know anyone who has been charged with a felony, and 
whether they think that criminal sentencing needs reform. The 
speeding question was intended to act as a proxy for risk preferences. 
The questions about personal criminal history and acquaintance 
criminal history were intended to act as proxies for familiarity with the 
criminal justice system. And the question about sentencing reform was 
intended to elicit underlying beliefs about the criminal justice system. 
A sample of the complete survey is included in the Appendix.126  
 
 126. One commentator suggested that the language used to convey the imposition of collateral 
consequences (“As a consequence of pleading guilty to the offense you will lose your right to vote, 
will lose your nursing license, and will no longer be eligible for federal benefits such as foods [sic] 
stamps and public housing”) may have caused some respondents to believe that the consequences 
only attached if they pleaded guilty, not if they were found guilty at trial. It is possible that some 
respondents did so, and results may be overstated if they did. Extensive pre-testing and review of 
the survey, however, mitigate such concerns. About thirty individuals—comprised of individuals 
with legal expertise and those without such expertise—participated in taking an earlier version of 
the experiment and provided feedback without raising such concerns. An additional ten 
individuals pre-tested the current survey and provided feedback, similarly without raising such 
concerns.  
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Though the survey directly addresses only a subset of guilty 
pleas—those made in response to a guaranteed-sentence plea offer 
when a defendant is not in pretrial detention—there are reasons to 
believe the results may be more broadly applicable. With regard to more 
common recommended-sentence plea bargains, research suggests that 
the greatest predictor of sentence duration is the prosecutor’s 
recommendation even though there is greater defendant uncertainty 
about the ultimate sentence a judge will assign.127 Extending the 
results to “straight up” pleading, where a defendant pleads guilty 
without any bargaining, is more complex. Although the defendant may 
plead guilty in the hope that the judge will be more lenient at 
sentencing, there is substantially greater uncertainty. This uncertainty 
is likely to increase the expected cost of pleading guilty. Therefore, 
communicating collateral consequences and making the full cost of 
conviction apparent should make defendants less likely to waive their 
right to trial.  
2. Hypotheses 
Responses to the survey questions are used to test four 
hypotheses deriving from the discussion of the shadow of a trial theory 
in Part II.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Guilty defendants will be more likely to plead 
guilty and waive the right to trial. 
Hypothesis 2: Defendants will be more likely to plead guilty and 
waive the right to trial as the potential post-trial sentence 
increases.  
Hypothesis 3: Defendants will be more likely to plead guilty and 
waive the right to trial when collateral consequences are not 
communicated. 
Hypothesis 4: Defendants will be less likely to consider collateral 
consequences when they are not explicitly disclosed. 
 
The first two hypotheses derive from the conventional shadow of 
a trial theory of plea bargaining and are likely to be relevant regardless 
of whether collateral consequences are communicated.128 Even if the 
theory fails to explain the universe of plea bargaining behavior, it is 
likely that a defendant’s guilt informs his expectation of being convicted 
at trial and increases the expected cost of going to trial, thus making a 
 
 127. Martín & Alonso, supra note 125.  
 128. See supra Section II.A.  
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given plea offer more attractive. Similarly, as the severity of the 
sentence increases, the expected cost of going to trial increases, making 
a given plea offer more attractive and more likely to be accepted.   
The second two hypotheses are informed by the imperfect 
information and behavioral deviations from rational decisionmaking 
discussed in Part II.B. Defendants are unlikely to spend much time 
considering collateral consequences when the consequences are not 
explicitly communicated, because defendants are either not aware of 
the existence of such consequences or they are not salient during plea 
negotiations if not explicitly communicated (or both). Consequently, 
defendants are hypothesized to be more prone to either fail to 
incorporate the cost of collateral consequences into their analysis or 
narrowly frame the decision as one only about prison, making them 
more likely to accept the offer. Conversely, making collateral 
consequences salient may encourage defendants to update their 
perception of the cost of accepting the plea offer, thus making them 
more likely to make the risky decision to go to trial because the cost of 
trial is less outsized relative to the offer.  
B. Experiment Results 
Results from the experiment demonstrate that communicating 
collateral consequences is important for making plea bargain decisions. 
Aggregate results across the different sentence possibilities 
demonstrate that communicating collateral consequences decreases the 
rate of plea acceptance. Results disaggregated by length of sentence 
further reveal that communicating collateral consequences has a 
greater impact when the potential sentence at trial is lower, and the 
effect dissipates as the difference between the plea bargain sentence 
and the sentence at trial grows larger. Finally, the results suggest that 
communicating collateral consequences affects decisions by increasing 
defendant awareness of the consequences. It is not possible, however, 
to determine whether such increased awareness comes from 
encountering new information or from making previously held 
information salient in the defendant’s decisionmaking.  
1. Pooled Results 
To examine the overall impact of guilt and collateral 
consequences on decisions to accept a plea offer, responses were pooled 
across all potential sentence lengths. Figure 1 presents the pooled 
results for acceptance by guilty and not guilty respondents. 
Respondents assigned to a guilty condition accepted the plea offer 80% 
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of the time. In contrast, respondents assigned to the not guilty condition 
accepted the plea offer only 37% of the time. The difference in 
acceptances between the two conditions is statistically significant.129 
This result supports Hypothesis 1 that guilty defendants are more 
likely to accept plea bargains. It provides some support for the shadow 
of a trial theory because guilty defendants likely perceive a greater 
likelihood of conviction at trial.  
 
FIGURE 1: PLEA ACCEPTANCE – GUILT 
 
 
Note: Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval. 
 
Figure 2 presents the pooled results for acceptance based on 
whether respondents received communication of collateral 
consequences. Respondents who did not receive communication about 
collateral consequences accepted the plea offer 65% of the time, while 
respondents who did receive communication accepted the offer only 53% 
of the time. This difference is statistically significant. This finding—
that respondents who receive communication about collateral 
consequences are less likely to accept the offer—supports Hypothesis 4. 
 
 129. A difference is statistically significant at a given level if the probability of observing a 
difference as large as the difference observed in a sample would be less than the given level if no 
true effect existed. JEFFREY WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS 133–35 (5th ed. 2012). 
The level at which something is significant is determined by a “p-value.” An estimate is generally 
considered strongly significant at the 1% level (if p < 0.01), significant at the 5% level (if p < 0.05), 
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FIGURE 2: PLEA ACCEPTANCE – COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
 
 
Note: Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval. 
2. Results by Sentence Severity 
Examining the impact of communicating collateral 
consequences on plea bargaining decisions across different sentence 
severities provides more detailed information about the factors 
influencing the respondent’s choices. It helps identify the distributional 
impact of communicating collateral consequences by eliciting 
information about when respondents are likely to care about collateral 
consequences. Furthermore, it demonstrates the importance of the 
sentence defendants can expect after conviction at trial. Figure 3 
presents results on the rate of plea acceptance for each sentence 
severity and condition (guilty or not guilty and collateral consequences 
communicated or not communicated). Across conditions, respondents 
were generally more likely to accept the plea offer as the severity of the 
sentence increased, innocent respondents were less likely to accept the 
plea offer, and communicating collateral consequences decreased the 
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Figure 4 presents results for the decision to accept the plea offer 
when the sentence if convicted after trial was one year. Eighty-five 
percent of guilty respondents accepted the offer when collateral 
consequences were not communicated and 65% accepted when they 
were communicated. Among innocent respondents, 18% accepted the 
offer when collateral consequences were communicated, while 28% 
accepted when collateral consequences were not. Additional regression 
analysis130 results reveal that communicating collateral consequences 
decreased the likelihood of acceptance by about 15% (significant at the 
5% level), while being guilty increased the likelihood of acceptance by 
about 50% (significant at the 1% level).  
 
 
 130. Regression analysis is a statistical method that allows for the examination of the 
relationship between multiple variables. It enables inferences about which of various factors, or 
independent variables, are affecting an outcome one is interested in, the dependent variable. See 












1 yr 3 yrs 6 yrs 10 yrs
Not Guilty CC Not Guilty No CC Guilty CC Guilty No CC
6_Malone (Do Not Delete) 5/22/2020  7:06 PM 
1190 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:4:1161 
FIGURE 4: PLEA ACCEPTANCE – 1 YEAR 
 
 
Note: Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval. 
 
Figure 5 presents results for the decision to accept the plea offer 
when the sentence if convicted after trial was three years. When 
collateral consequences were not communicated, 89% of guilty 
respondents accepted the plea offer and 37% of innocent respondents 
accepted the plea offer. In contrast, when collateral consequences were 
communicated, 75% of guilty respondents and 27% of innocent 
respondents accepted the offer, respectively. Regression results 
demonstrate that communicating collateral consequences decreased the 
likelihood of acceptance by about 12% (significant at the 10% level), 
while being guilty continued to increase the likelihood of acceptance by 
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FIGURE 5: PLEA ACCEPTANCE – 3 YEARS 
 
 
Note: Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval. 
 
Figure 6 presents results for the decision to accept the plea offer 
when the sentence if convicted after trial was six years. When collateral 
consequences were not communicated, 85% of guilty respondents 
accepted the plea offer and 48% of innocent respondents accepted the 
plea offer. In contrast, when collateral consequences were 
communicated, 78% of guilty respondents and 39% of innocent 
respondents accepted the offer. Regression results demonstrate that 
communicating collateral consequences is no longer statistically 
significant in determining acceptance, while being guilty increased the 
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FIGURE 6: PLEA ACCEPTANCE – 6 YEARS 
 
 
Note: Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval. 
 
Figure 7 presents results for the decision to accept the plea offer 
when the sentence if convicted after trial was ten years. About 83% of 
guilty respondents accepted the plea offer, regardless of communication 
about collateral consequences. Among innocent respondents, 41% 
accepted the offer when collateral consequences were communicated 
and 57% accepted the offer when collateral consequences were not 
communicated. Again, regression results demonstrate that 
communicating collateral consequences was not statistically significant 
in determining acceptance, while being guilty increased the likelihood 












Not Guilty CC Not Guilty No CC Guilty CC Guilty No CC
6_Malone (Do Not Delete) 5/22/2020  7:06 PM 
2020] COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES & PLEA BARGAINS 1193 
FIGURE 7: PLEA ACCEPTANCE – 10 YEARS 
 
 
Note: Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval. 
 
Collectively, these results reinforce the findings from the pooled 
responses. The results suggest that communicating collateral 
consequences is important to ensuring that defendants are making 
informed, considered decisions. The decreasing sensitivity of 
respondents to collateral consequences, however, suggests that when 
the trial tax or plea discount grows, we should be wary that the 
resulting pleas are fair and accurate.  
3. Contributing Factors 
The results regarding which factors were important to 
respondents’ decisions to accept or reject the plea offer provide further 
evidence that communicating collateral consequences is important to 
decisionmaking. Figure 8 presents the frequency of responses related to 
guilt status. Across conditions, guilt was generally very important to 
respondents, both motivating guilty respondents to accept the plea offer 
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Figure 9 presents the frequency of responses related to jail time. 
Across conditions, the possibility of jail time was also very important to 
respondents, with only a handful of respondents rating it as either 
somewhat important or important and very few respondents rating it 
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Figure 10 presents the frequency of responses related to wanting 
to put the issue behind them. The importance of this factor appears to 
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Figure 11 presents the frequency of responses related to losing 
one’s nursing license. Among both innocent and guilty respondents, 
communicating collateral consequences had a significant impact on how 
important they considered this factor to be. This pattern supports 
Hypothesis 4—that individuals do not pay attention to collateral 
consequences, either because they are unaware of them or inattentive 
to them, unless the consequences are explicitly communicated. Further, 
it provides evidence that the mechanism driving differences in 
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Figure 12 presents frequency of the responses related to losing 
other benefits. Similar to the trend above, among both innocent and 
guilty respondents, communicating collateral consequences had a 
significant impact on how important they found this factor. This 
provides further support for Hypothesis 4 and the finding that 
communicating collateral consequences is important for plea bargain 
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FIGURE 12: IMPORTANCE OF LOSING OTHER BENEFITS 
 
 
IV. PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF DEFENDANTS 
The experimental findings provide evidence of two important 
outcomes related to plea bargaining and collateral consequences. First, 
communicating collateral consequences matters—respondents were 
significantly more likely to exercise their right to trial when collateral 
consequences were communicated as part of the plea bargain offer. 
Second, the effect of communicating collateral consequences dissipates 
when the difference between the plea offer sentence and the potential 
sentence at trial grows larger. Recognizing that plea bargaining is 
entrenched in the justice system, this Part suggests one way to mitigate 
unfair and inaccurate results stemming from unaddressed 
shortcomings of the shadow of a trial theory of plea bargaining.131 The 
Supreme Court should find that failing to communicate relevant 
collateral consequences constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel 
under the Strickland standard.132  
Requiring communication of collateral consequences by counsel 
has several advantages. First, requiring judges to explain the collateral 
consequences of a guilty plea would require overturning the well-
established precedent in Brady that judges need only communicate the 
 
 131. See sources cited supra note 107. 
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direct consequences of guilty plea.133 Second, counsel has the 
opportunity to communicate collateral consequences to defendants in 
conditions much more conducive to considered reflection than judges. 
When defendants are at the stage of entering a guilty plea, they are 
more likely to have locked in their decision than when they are merely 
considering such a plea in the context of plea bargaining.   
The Supreme Court has already laid the groundwork needed to 
ensure that defendants understand the collateral consequences 
associated with a guilty plea. In McMann, the Court held that 
defendants have a right to competent legal advice regarding guilty 
pleas.134 In Hill, the Court extended the two-prong test for ineffective 
counsel developed in Strickland to guilty pleas and clarified that 
prejudice in the plea context is demonstrated when there is “a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] 
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 
trial.”135 And in Padilla, the Court emphasized the “weight of prevailing 
professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her 
client regarding the risk of deportation” and the ease of determining the 
consequence of deportation while casting doubt on the notion that the 
“distinction between direct and collateral consequences . . . define[s] 
the scope of constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance.’ ”136 In 
light of this precedent, the Court should adopt a straightforward 
application of the Strickland standard and explicitly reject the test 
distinguishing between direct and collateral consequences still used by 
most lower courts.137  
As the Court recognized in Padilla, the first prong of 
Strickland—whether counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness—is measured against “prevailing professional 
norms.”138 In reaching its decision in the case, the Court reiterated its 
long-held practice of relying on “American Bar Association standards 
 
 133. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). 
 134. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970) (holding that “a defendant’s plea of 
guilty based on reasonably competent advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack on the ground 
that counsel may have misjudged the admissibility of the defendant’s confession”).  
 135. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (applying the Strickland test to guilty pleas); 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88 (determining whether counsel was ineffective based on (1) whether 
“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) whether 
counsel’s “deficient performance prejudiced the defense”).  
 136. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365, 367 (2010).  
 137. See, e.g., United States v. Youngs, 687 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that a guilty 
plea is valid when the defendant was unaware of the collateral consequence of civil commitment); 
United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 382 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that a guilty plea is valid 
where defendants are unaware of collateral consequences such as the loss of benefits).  
 138. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 357; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. 
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and the like” as guides for determining what is reasonable.139 The ABA 
Criminal Justice Standards provide:  
Defense counsel should identify, and advise the client of, collateral consequences that may 
arise from charge, plea or conviction. Counsel should investigate consequences under 
applicable federal, state, and local laws, and seek assistance from others with greater 
knowledge in specialized areas in order to be adequately informed as to the existence and 
details of relevant collateral consequences. Such advice should be provided sufficiently in 
advance that it may be fairly considered in a decision to pursue trial, plea, or other 
dispositions.140 
Further, the responsibilities contemplated in the ABA standards are 
consistent with other materials and guides predating the current ABA 
standards, demonstrating that this professional norm is well 
established.141 In its opinion, the Court also noted the ease with which 
counsel could determine the deportation consequences at issue in 
Padilla.142 The advent of the National Inventory of Collateral 
Consequences Inventory makes determination of all collateral 
consequences easily accessible to counsel and supports extension of 
Padilla’s reasoning to other collateral consequences.143  
Fears regarding significant increases in ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims resulting from subjecting communication of collateral 
consequences to the effective assistance of counsel requirements of 
Strickland are tempered by the second prong of the test, a showing of 
prejudice.144 As the Court recognized in Padilla, history teaches that 
pleas are infrequently the subject of collateral challenges relative to 
trial convictions; although “[p]leas account for nearly 95% of all 
criminal convictions . . . they account for only approximately 30% of the 
habeas petitions filed.”145 Indeed, the standard for prejudice announced 
in Hill—“a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the 
defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial”—is likely self-enforcing, for a defendant who collaterally 
attacks his guilty plea seeks to trade the benefit of the bargain for a 
trial.146 Indeed, such disclosure brings the decision to accept a plea offer 
more in line with the theory underlying the shadow of a trial theory. 
Individuals who would have accepted the plea bargain with full 
 
 139. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366.  
 140. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 4-5.4 (2015).  
 141. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 83, at 714–17. 
 142. 559 U.S. at 368.  
 143. See Collateral Consequences Inventory, supra note 8. 
 144. 466 U.S. at 687–88. 
 145. 559 U.S. at 372. 
 146. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (applying the Strickland test to guilty pleas); see 
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373 (“Those who collaterally attack their guilty pleas lose the benefit of the 
bargain obtained as a result of the plea.”). 
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information about collateral consequences in the first instance should 
not be expected to seek a trial, but those who would have rejected the 
plea offer given full information will be given their opportunity for trial. 
Thus, an earnest application of precedent should lead the Court to 
require communication of collateral consequences, and concerns that 
doing so will open the gate to an unprecedented number of challenges 
should not be overstated.  
CONCLUSION 
The overwhelming majority of criminal convictions in the United 
States are obtained through guilty pleas, yet the system of justice 
overwhelmingly protects the rights of defendants who participate in 
trials, not plea bargaining. The Supreme Court has historically relied 
on an erroneous, or at the very least, incomplete, theory of what 
motivates defendants to accept plea offers. As the experimental 
outcomes in this Note demonstrate, communicating collateral 
consequences is important to ensure that defendants are making 
informed decisions when accepting a plea bargain offer. 
Communicating collateral consequences to defendants at the plea 
bargaining stage is an important step in protecting the rights of 
defendants, but a modest one. As Edkins and Dervan’s research 
demonstrates, in cases of pretrial detention defendants’ desire to be 
released immediately may induce guilty pleas despite such 
communication. And, as the study in this Note demonstrates, when the 
potential sentence at trial grows very large, such communication is 
unlikely to influence defendant decisionmaking, making broad 
prosecutorial charging discretion problematic. 
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